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MEYERTONS, HOOD, KIVLIN, KOWERT & GOETZEL, P.C. P.O. BOX 398 AUSTIN, TX 78767-0398				
			EXAMINER FISCHER, ANDREW J	
			ART UNIT 3627	PAPER NUMBER

DATE MAILED: 11/07/2005

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Office Action Summary

Application No.

09/982,214

Applicant(s)

VISWANATH ET AL.

Examiner

Andrew J. Fischer

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-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --
Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 11 July 2005.
- 2a) ☐ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☒ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 17-19, 25 and 31-45 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) 31-45 is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 17-19 and 25 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
- ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
 - ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
 - ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- 1) ☒ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
- 6) ☐ Other: _____

DETAILED ACTION

Acknowledgements

1. Applicants' response filed July 11, 2005 is acknowledged. Accordingly, claims 17-19, 25, and 31-45 remain pending.
2. Claims 31-45 are withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.142(b), as being drawn to a nonelected invention, there being no allowable generic or linking claim.
3. This Office Action, the "First Final Office Action" is given Paper No. 20051101.
4. The amendment to the specification filed July 11, 2005 has been entered.
5. All references in this Office Action to the capitalized versions of "Applicants" refers specifically the Applicants of record. References to lower case versions of "applicant" or "applicants" refers to any or all patent "applicants." Unless expressly noted otherwise, references to "Examiner" in this Office Action refers to the Examiner of record while reference to or use of the lower case version of "examiner" or "examiners" refers to examiner(s) generally.
6. This Office Action is written in OACS. Because of this, the Examiner is unable to control formatting, paragraph numbering, font, spelling, line spacing, and/or other word processing issues. The Examiner sincerely apologies for these errors.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §101

7. 35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

8. Claims 17-25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. The claims do not produce a "useful, concrete, tangible result."

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AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358, 50 USPQ2d 1447, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1999); *In re Warmerdam*, 33 F3d 1354, 31 USPQ2d 1754 (Fed Cir 1994). The claims currently recite software and software is not one of the four statutory classes of patentable subject matter. The Examiner suggests by way of example only positively reciting an object (e.g. computer, medium, etc.) or producing a result. Applicant is reminded that “configured to” language is not a positive recitation which produces a result.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §112 2nd Paragraph

9. The following is a quotation of the 2nd paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §112:

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

10. Claims 17-25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, 2nd paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

a. In claim 17, the phrase “configured to maintain data persistence of files stored in a database” is indefinite because it not known if the database includes “corresponding files, in-bound and outbound documents, and/or other files.

b. Claim 18 is indefinite because it is not known if the “comprising” is ‘in replacement of’ or ‘in addition to’ the previous method steps. Moreover, it is axiomatic that if interpreted to be ‘in replacement of,’ such an interpretation would fail the “Infringement Test” as noted in MPEP §608.01(n) III. After review of all the evidence of record and because of the lack of evidence to the contrary, the Examiner adapts the presumption that the term “wherein” connotes a different meaning than the term “further

comprising.” See *CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fielder GmbH & Co. KG*, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317, 55 USPQ2d 1804, 1810 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these different terms in the claims connotes different meanings.”).¹

With this presumption and because Applicant(s) use “further comprising” in claim 32, the Examiner concludes that claims which *do not* recite ‘further comprising’ are presumed to have a meaning other than ‘further comprising.’ In particular, if Applicants intended the phrase “comprising” in claim 18 to be *in addition to*, Applicants would have also recited ‘further comprising’ or similar language in claim 18 just as they did in claims 25 and 32. In other words, had Applicants actually meant ‘further comprising’ in claim 18, 24, 27, 29, and 30 they would have used those words.² However as of the date of this Office Action, Applicants have chosen not to recite ‘further comprising’ or similar claim language in claims 25 and 32.

c. In claim 26, it is unclear what is “appropriate content suitable for a suitable for an underlying markup language”

¹ See also *Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson*, 821 F.2d 627, 632, 3 USPQ2d 1109, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting that the meaning of claim terms must be defined in a manner that is consistent with its appearance in other claims in the same patent); *c.f. Bancorp Services LLC v. Hartford Life Insurance Co.*, 69 USPQ2d 1996, 2000-01 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“That inference, however, is not conclusive; it is not unknown for different words to be used to express similar concepts, even though it may be poor drafting practice.”)

² See *e.g. International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp.*, 70 USPQ2d 1209, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (where the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s determination that ‘adjoining’ was synonymous with ‘adjacent.’ “Had the inventor meant ‘adjacent,’ he could have used that word.”)

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11. The Examiner finds that because the claims are indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112 2nd paragraph, it is impossible to properly construe claim scope at this time. See *Honeywell International Inc. v. ITC*, 68 USPQ2d 1023, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Because the claims are indefinite, the claims, by definition, cannot be construed.”). However, in accordance with MPEP §2173.06 and the USPTO’s policy of trying to advance prosecution by providing art rejections even though these claim are indefinite, the claims are construed and the art is applied *as much as practically possible*.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §103

12. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. §103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office Action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

13. Claims 17-22 and 24-30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Rivera et. al. (U.S. 2002/0107699 A1)(“Rivera”) in view of Bowker et. al. (U.S. 6,601,071 B1)(“Bowker”). Rivera discloses the claimed invention including receiving a purchase request from the buyer in the buyer’s “native format” Rivera is however silent as to what constitutes the buyer’s native format. Therefore it is the Examiner’s position that Rivera does not exclude the native format as being an XML format.

Additionally Bowker directly teaches translating between first and second XML formats so that business may communicate more effectively with one another. Therefore it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to

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modify Rivera as taught by Bowker to include XML as the buyer's native format. Such a modification would have helped businesses to exchange information without having to know, and provide separate conversion tools for the various business formats.

14. Claim 23 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over the Rivera/Bowker combination and in further view of Andersson (U.S. 2002/0087419 A1)(“Andersson”). Rivera discloses as discussed above but (as noted in the previous office action) does not directly disclose that the markup content is substantially compliant with HDML. Andersson teaches the use of markup language compliant with HDML. Therefore it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the Rivera/Bowker combination as taught by Andersson to include markup content is substantially compliant with HDML.

15. After careful review of the specification and prosecution history, the Examiner is unaware of any desire—either expressly or implicitly—by Applicants to be their own lexicographer and to define a claim term to have a meaning other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning. Therefore, the Examiner starts with the heavy presumption that all claim limitations are given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. See *Bell Atlantic Network Services Inc. v. Covad Communications Group Inc.*, 262 F.3d 1258, 1268, 59 USPQ2d 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001)(“[T]here is a heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.”); *CCS Fitness Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.*, 288 F.3d 1359,1366, 62 USPQ2d 1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (There is a “heavy presumption that a

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claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning.”). See also MPEP §2111.01 and *In re Zletz*, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989).³

In accordance with the ordinary and accustomed meaning presumption, during examination the claims are interpreted with their “broadest reasonable interpretation” *In re Morris*, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also MPEP §2111.

However, if Applicants disagree with the Examiner and have either (a) already used lexicography or (b) wish to use lexicography and therefore (under either (a) or (b)) desire a claim limitation to have a meaning other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning, the Examiner respectfully requests Applicants in their next response to expressly indicate⁴ the claim limitation at issue and to show where in the specification or prosecution history the limitation is defined. Such definitions must be clearly stated in the specification or file history. *Bell Atlantic*, 262 F.3d at 1268, 59 USPQ2d at 1870, (“[I]n redefining the meaning of particular claim terms away from the ordinary meaning, the intrinsic evidence must ‘clearly set forth’ or ‘clearly redefine’ a claim

³ It is the Examiner’s position that “plain meaning” and “ordinary and accustomed meaning” are synonymous. See e.g. *Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp.*, 274 F.3d 1336, 1342, 60 USPQ2d 1851, 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A]ll terms in a patent claim are to be given their plain, ordinary and accustomed meaning . . .”).

⁴ “Absent an *express intent* to impart a novel meaning, terms in a claim are to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. [Emphasis added.]” *Wenger Manufacturing Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1225, 1232, 57 USPQ2d 1679, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). “In the absence of an *express intent* to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor’s claim terms take on their ordinary meaning. We indulge a heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. [Emphasis added.]” *Teleflex Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp.*, 299 F.3d 1313, 1325, 63 USPQ2d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and quotations omitted).

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term so as to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee intended to so redefine the claim term”).⁵ The Examiner cautions that no new matter is allowed.

Applicants are reminded that failure by Applicants in their next response to properly traverse this issue in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) or to be non-responsive to this issue entirely will be considered a desire by Applicants to forgo lexicography in this application and to continue having the claims interpreted with their broadest reasonable interpretation.⁶

Additionally, it is the Examiner's position that the above requirements are reasonable.⁷ Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner, the preceding discussion on claim interpretation principles applies to all examined claims currently pending.

16. To the extent that the Examiner's interpretations are in dispute with Applicants' interpretations, the Examiner hereby adopts the following definitions—under the broadest

⁵ See also *Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.*, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996), (“[A] patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, *as long as* the special definition of the term is *clearly stated* in the patent specification or file history. [Emphasis added.]”); *Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd.*, 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45 USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Such special meaning, however, must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the field of the invention.”). See also MPEP §2111.01, subsection titled “Applicant May Be Own Lexicographer” and MPEP §2173.05(a) titled “New Terminology.”

⁶ See 37 C.F.R. §1.104(c)(3) which states in part: “the examiner may rely upon admissions by applicant . . . as to *any matter* affecting patentability [Emphasis added.]”

⁷ The Examiner's requirements on this matter are reasonable on at least two separate and independent grounds. First, the Examiner's requirements are simply an express request for clarification of how Applicants intend their claims to be interpreted so that lexicography (or even an *attempt* at lexicography) by Applicants is not inadvertently overlooked by the Examiner. Second, the requirements are reasonable in view of the USPTO's goals of compact prosecution, productivity with particular emphasis on reductions in both pendency and cycle time, and other goals as outlined in the USPTO's The 21st Century Strategic Plan, February 3, 2003 available at www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/index.htm (last accessed November 1, 2005).

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reasonable interpretation standard—in all his claim interpretations.⁸ Moreover, while the following list is provided in accordance with *In re Morris*, the definitions are a guide to claim terminology since claim terms must be interpreted in context of the surrounding claim language.⁹ Finally, the following list is not intended to be exhaustive in any way:

Database “A file composed of records, each containing fields together with a set of operations for searching, sorting, recombining and other functions.” Computer Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Microsoft Press, Redmond, WA, 1997.¹⁰

Network: “A group of computers and associated network devices that are connected by communications facilities.” Id. **Server**: “2. On the Internet or other network, a computer or program that responds to commands from a client. Id. **Client**: “3. On a local area network or Internet, a computer that accesses shared network resources provided by another computer (called a server).” Id. **Computer**: “Any machine that does three things: accepts structured input, processes it according to prescribed rules, and produces the results as output.” Id.

⁸ While most definitions are cited because these terms are found in the claims, the Examiner may have provided additional definition(s) to help interpret words, phrases, or concepts found in the definitions themselves or in the prior art.

⁹ See e.g. *Brookhill-Wilk I LLC v. Intuitive Surgical Inc.*, 334 F.3d 1294, 1300, 67 USPQ2d 1132, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (abstract dictionary definitions are not alone determinative; “resort must always be made to the surrounding text of the claims in question”).

¹⁰ Based upon Applicants’ disclosure, the art of record, and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in this art as determined by the factors discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that the *Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary* is an appropriate technical dictionary known to be used by one of ordinary skill in this art. See e.g. *Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp.*, 318 F.3d 1363, 1373, 65 USPQ2d 1865, 1872 (Fed. Cir. 2003) where the Federal Circuit used the *Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary* (3d ed.) as “a technical dictionary” to define the term “flag.” See also *In re Barr*, 444 F.2d 588, 170 USPQ 330 (CCPA 1971)(noting that its appropriate to use technical dictionaries in order to ascertain the meaning of a term of art) and MPEP §2173.05(a) titled ‘New Terminology.’

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17. Functional recitations using the word “for” or other functional terms (*e.g.* “for providing Extensible Markup Language (XML) content from a database to a purchase order request in an electronic purchasing network” as recited in claim 26) have been considered but given less patentable weight¹¹ because they fail to add any steps and are thereby regarded as intended use language. To be especially clear, while all limitations have been considered, not all limitations are entitled to patentable weight. See MPEP §2111.04. A recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in additional steps. See *Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc.*, 246 F.3d 1368, 1375-76, 58 USPQ2d 1508, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Where the language in a method claim states only a purpose and intended result, the expression does not result in a manipulative difference in the steps of the claim.).

18. Additionally, the Examiner notes that “the PTO and the CCPA acknowledged product-by-process claims as an exception to the general rule requiring claims to define products in terms of structural characteristics.” *Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.*, 970 F.2d 834, 845, 23 USPQ2d 1481, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (hereinafter “*Atlantic Thermoplastics v. Faytex I*”). Furthermore, the Federal Circuit “acknowledges that it has in effect recognized . . . product-by-process claims as exceptional.” *Atlantic Thermoplastics v. Faytex I*, 970 F.2d at 847, 23 USPQ2d at 1491.

Because of this exceptional status, the Examiner has carefully reviewed the claims and it is the Examiner’s position that claims 17-30 *do not* contain any product-by-process limitations whether in a conventional format or otherwise. If Applicants disagree with the Examiner, the

¹¹ See *e.g. In re Gulack*, 703 F.2d 1381, 217 USPQ 401, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1983)(stating that although all limitations must be considered, not all limitations are entitled to patentable weight).

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Examiner respectfully requests Applicants in their next response to expressly point out any product-by-process claim(s) and their limitations so that they may be afforded their exceptional status and treated accordingly. Applicants are reminded that “even though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself.” *In re Thorpe*, 777 F.2d 695, 697, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).¹² Failure by Applicants in their next response to also address this issue in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) or to be non-responsive to this issue entirely will be considered intent by Applicant(s) *not* to recite any product-by-process limitations. Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner, the preceding discussion on product-by-process principles applies to all examined claims currently pending.

19. For claim interpretation purposes, the Examiner notes that unless the language of the claims states otherwise, the claimed method steps need not necessarily be performed by the prior art in the order recited. Clearly all method steps in at least claims 17 and 26 need not necessarily be performed in the exact order recited.

Response to Arguments

20. Applicants’ arguments filed July 11, 2005 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.

21. Regarding the restriction, Applicants arguments are not persuasive because Applicants have not argued that groups of inventions are not patentably distinct. If however Applicants

¹² See also MPEP §2113.

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argue that the groups of inventions are patentably distinct, the Examiner will reconsider the restriction.

22. Regarding the prior art, Applicants argue that “Rivera fails to teach gathering XML content from in-bound documents and”¹³ The Examiner has reviewed independent claims 17 and 26 and however can not locate “gathering XML content” as argued by Applicants. As Judge Clevenger has so eloquently summarized these types of arguments, “The invention disclosed in [applicants’] written description may be outstanding in its field, but the name of the game is the claim.” *In re Hiniker Co.*, 150 F.3d 1362, 1369, 47 USPQ2d 1523, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Applicants’ arguments have been considered but are not persuasive.

23. Applicants also argue that “Rivera does not disclose receiving purchase orders in an XML format.”¹⁴ Again, the Examiner has reviewed independent claims 17 and 26 and however can not locate “receiving purchase orders in an XML format.” Applicants’ arguments have been considered but are not persuasive.

24. Applicants remaining arguments have been considered but are moot in view of the new grounds of rejection.

Conclusion

25. References considered pertinent to Applicants’ disclosure are listed on form PTO-892. All references listed on form PTO-892 are cited in their entirety.

¹³ Applicants’ “Remarks” filed July 11, 2005, Page 5, last two lines.

¹⁴ Applicants’ “Remarks” filed July 11, 2005, Page 6, ~line 8.

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26. The following three (3) citations to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) apply to this Office Action: MPEP citations to Chapters 200-900, 1200-1400, and 1700-1900, 2100, 2200, 2600 are from the MPEP 8th Edition, Rev. 3, August 2005. MPEP citations to Chapters 100, 1000, 1100, 1500, 2000, 2500, and 2700 are from the MPEP 8th Edition, Rev. 2, May 2004. MPEP citations to Chapters 1600, 2300, 2400 are from MPEP 8th Edition, August 2001.

27. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

28. Applicants are reminded that patents are written by and for skilled artisans. See *Vivid Technologies, Inc. v. American Science and Engineering, Inc.*, 200 F.3d 795, 804, 53 USPQ2d 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“patents are written by and for skilled artisans”). The Examiner therefore starts with the presumption that Applicants are skilled artisans who possess at least ordinary skill in the art. Consequently, it is the Examiner’s position that because the patent references of record are directed to those with ordinary skill in this art, these references are clear, explicit, and specific as to what they teach. Nevertheless some applicants apparently have difficulty understanding the references. In an effort to maintain compact prosecution, provide due process, and to help these applicants understand the contents of a reference when viewed from the position of one of ordinary skill in this art, Applicants are hereby given actual notice

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that if after reasonably reading any reference of record, if Applicants can not reasonably understand or if Applicants have difficulty comprehending one or more sentence(s), statement(s), diagram(s), or principle(s) set forth in one or more of the reference(s) of record, Applicants should (in their next appropriately filed response) bring this issue to the attention of the Examiner. In addition to bringing this issue to the attention of the Examiner, and in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b), Applicants' response must also state *why* they either do not understand or have difficulty comprehending the reference. If after properly receiving (*i.e.* Applicants' response is made of record) both Applicants' request for understanding and the reasons as to *why* the request is made—and assuming the reference is germane to at least one outstanding rejection—the Examiner may either provide a substitute reference, or alternatively, do his best to elucidate the particular sentence(s), statement(s), diagram(s), or principles(s) at issue in a reasonable manner.

29. In accordance with *In re Lee*, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344-45, 61 USPQ2d 1430, 1434-35 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the Examiner finds that the references How Computers Work Millennium Ed. by Ron White; How Networks Work, Millennium Ed. by Frank J. Derfler et. al.; and How the Internet Works, 6th Ed. by Preston Gralla are additional evidence of what is basic knowledge or common sense to one of ordinary skill in this art. Each reference is cited in its entirety. Moreover, because these three references are directed towards beginners (see *e.g.* “User Level Beginning . . .”), because of the references' basic content (which is self-evident upon review of the references), and after further review of the entire application and all the art now of record in conjunction with the factors as discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that these three references are primarily directed towards those of low skill in this art.

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Because these three references are directed towards those of low skill in this art, the Examiner finds that one of ordinary skill in this art must—at the very least—be aware of and understand the knowledge and information contained within these three references.

30. Also and also in accordance with *In re Lee*, 277 F.3d at 1344-45, 61 USPQ2d at 1434-35, the Examiner finds that Nathan J. Muller's Desktop Encyclopedia of the Internet, ("Desktop Encyclopedia") is additional evidence of what is basic knowledge or common sense to one of ordinary skill in this art. Muller's Desktop Encyclopedia is a practical reference that clearly explains Internet services, applications, protocols, access methods, development tools, administration and management, standards, and regulations. Because of the reference's basic content (which is self-evident upon examination of the reference) and after further review of the entire record including the prior art now of record in conjunction with the factors as discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that the Desktop Encyclopedia is primarily directed towards those of low skill in this art. Because the reference is directed towards those of low skill in this art, the Examiner finds that one of ordinary skill in this art must—at the very least—be aware of and understand the knowledge and information contained within the Desktop Encyclopedia.

31. Finally and also in accordance with *In re Lee*, 277 F.3d at 1344-45, 61 USPQ2d at 1434-35, the Examiner finds that the reference Purchasing & Supply Management, Text and Cases, 6th Ed. by Dobler et. al. ("Dobler") is additional evidence of what is basic knowledge or common sense to one of ordinary skill in this art. The Examiner finds that Dobler describes basic supply management practices. The reference is cited in its entirety. The Examiner notes that each chapter is designed to 'stand by itself.' Because "[w]ell known text books in English are obvious

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research materials.” *In re Howarth*, 654, F.2d 103, 210 USPQ 689, 692 (CCPA 1981), because this textbook is self described as a “basic text,” because the textbook is in its 6th edition and its forth decade of use, the Examiner finds that Dobler is obvious research material. After further review of the entire record including the prior art now of record in conjunction with the factors as discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that Dobler is primarily directed towards those of low skill in this art. Because Dobler is directed towards those of low skill in this art, the Examiner finds that one of ordinary skill in this art must—at the very least—be aware of and understand the knowledge and information contained within Dobler.

32. In accordance with the USPTO’s goals of customer service, compact prosecution, and reduction of cycle time, the Examiner has made every effort to clarify his position regarding claim interpretation and any rejections or objections in this application. Furthermore, the Examiner has again provided Applicants with notice—for due process purposes—of his position regarding his factual determinations and legal conclusions. The Examiner notes and thanks Applicants for their “Remarks” (beginning on page 3) traversing the Examiner’s positions on various points. If Applicants disagree with any additional factual determination or legal conclusion made by the Examiner in this Office Action whether expressly stated or implied,¹⁵ the Examiner respectfully reminds Applicants to properly traverse the Examiner’s position(s) in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) in their next properly filed response. By addressing these issues now, matters where the Examiner and Applicants agree can be eliminated allowing the Examiner and Applicants to focus on areas of disagreement (if any) with the goal towards allowance in the shortest possible time. If Applicants have any questions regarding the

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Examiner's positions or have other questions regarding this communication or even previous communications, Applicants are strongly encouraged to contact Examiner Andrew J. Fischer whose telephone number is (571) 272-6779. If attempts to reach the Examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the Examiner's immediate supervisor, Alexander Kalinowski, can be reached at (571) 272-6771. The fax number for facsimile responses is now (571) 273-8300.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "A. J. Fischer" followed by the date "11/1/05".

Andrew J. Fischer
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 3627

AJF
November 1, 2005

¹⁵ *E.g.*, if the Examiner rejected a claim under §103 with two references, although not directly stated, it is the Examiner's implied position that the references are analogous art.